Abstract. Indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is the strongest notion for security of public key schemes. In this paper, we present the rst IND-CCA2 schemes whose securities are equivalent to factoring n = pq under the random oracle model, where p and q are prime numbers. Our rst scheme works for long messages and our second scheme is more ecient for short messages.
Introduction
Indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is the strongest notion of security for public key schemes. Bellare and Rogaway showed that a trapdoor one-way permutation f can be converted into a IND-CCA2 public key scheme in the random oracle model [1] . They further presented another IND-CCA2 scheme [2] , called OAEP, which is more ecient than their rst scheme for short messages.
RSA is believed to be a trapdoor one-way permutation. However, it is not known that inverting RSA is equivalent to factoring n = pq, where p and q are prime numbers.
On the other hand, Okamoto and Uchiyama showed a probabilistic public key scheme such that inverting the encryption function is equivalent to factoring a special modulus n = p 2 q [3] . Fujisaki, Okamoto and then Pointcheval showed some conversions of Okamoto and Uchiyama scheme into IND-CCA2 public key schemes in the random oracle model [4{6] . Paillier presented a trapdoor one-way permutation by modifying Okamoto and Uchiyama scheme [7] .
Paillier presented a probabilistic public key scheme which is IND-CPA under the composite residuosity assumption [8, Sec.4] , where IND-CPA stands for indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attack. Paillier also showed a variant of his scheme which is a trapdoor one-way permutation if and only if inverting RSA is hard [8, Sec.5] . Paillier and Pointcheval gave a conversion of Paillier's scheme [8, Sec.4 ] into a IND-CCA2 public key scheme in the random oracle model [9] .
However, no IND-CCA2 scheme is known whose security is equivalent to factoring n = pq. In this paper, we present the rst IND-CCA2 schemes whose securities are equivalent to factoring n = pq in the random oracle model by using Kurosawa et al's public key cryptosystem. Our rst scheme works for long messages. Our second scheme is more ecient for short messages. Rabin's public key cryptosystem [10] is as hard as factorization. However, it is not uniquely deciphered because four dierent plaintexts produce the same cipher. Williams showed that this disadvantage can be overcome if the secret two prime numbers, p and q, satisfy p = 3 mod 8; q = 7 mod 8 [11] . Kurosawa et al. [12] showed a public key cryptosystem such that (i) inverting is equivalent to factoring n = pq, (ii) the decryption is unique and (iii) p and q are arbitrary prime numbers.
Related works: Cramer and Shoup showed an IND-CCA2 scheme in the standard model under the decision Die-Hellman problem [13] 2 Preliminaries Let k be a security parameter. Let n(k) denote the length of a plaintext, where n(k) is bounded by some polynomial on k.
2.1 Denitions Denition 1. A public key encryption scheme with a plaintext length function n(1) is a triple of algorithms, 5 = (G; E; D), where { G, the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k and returns pair of (pk; sk) of matching public and secret keys, { E, the encryption algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a public key pk and a message x 2 f0; 1g n to produce a ciphertext y, { D, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext y to produce a message x 2 f0; 1g n or a special symbol ? to indicate that the ciphertext was invalid.
Our goal is to construct an encryption scheme which is indistinguishable secure (or semantically secure). We consider an adversary A = (A 1 ; A 2 ) who runs in two stages. In the nd-stage A 1 is given an encryption algorithm E and outputs a pair (x 0 ; x 1 ) of messages. It also outputs some string str, for example, its history and its inputs. In the guess-stage A 2 is given the outputs of A 1 , (x 0 ; x 1 ) and str, and also y which is a ciphertext of a message x b for random bit b. A 2 guesses a bit b 0 from x 0 ; x 1 and y, and outputs a guessing bit b 0 .
A simple A 2 who always outputs 0 (or 1) can succeed guessing b with probability 1=2. This shows that the minimal probability with which any A 2 can outputs correct bit is 1=2. We measure how well A is doing by the dierence between 1=2 and the probability in which A 2 
Kurosawa et al's Public Key Cryptosystem [12]
Kurosawa et al. [12] showed a public key cryptosystem such that (i) inverting is equivalent to factoring n = pq, (ii) the decryption is unique and (iii) p and q are arbitrary prime numbers. Their scheme is described as follows.
Key generation algorithm G: Choose two large primes p and q whose lengths are both k=2 bits. The secret key is a pair of p and q. 
Proposed Scheme for Long Messages
In this section, we present our rst IND-CCA2 scheme whose security is equivalent to factoring n = pq in the random oracle model, where p and q are arbitrary prime numbers. It works for long messages. We combine Kurosawa et al's scheme with Bellare and Rogaway's scheme of [1] . Note that the conversion of [1] requires a one-way permutation f while Y pk (x) of Sec. 2.2 is a four-to-one function.
Remember that k is a security parameter and n(k) denotes the length of a plaintext. Let k 0 (k) be an integer valued function bounded by some polynomial on k. Let G be a mapping from k bit strings to n bit strings and let H be a mapping from n + k bit strings to k 0 bit strings. They are treated as random oracles.
Then our scheme is described as follows.
Key generation algorithm G: Choose two large primes p and q whose lengths are both k=2 bits. The secret key is a pair of p and q. Encryption algorithm E: Suppose that the input is a message x which is a n bit string. First, E chooses a random number r 2 Z 3 N such that U pk (r) = 0 and V pk (r) = 0, where U pk (r) = 
; q D )-breaks our rst scheme in the sense of IND-CCA2 with at most q G queries to G and at most q H queries to H. Then there exists M which runs at most t (M ) steps and can factor N = pq with probability (M ) , where
; where T Y (k) denotes the time complexity of Y pk (x) and T Eu (k) denotes that of gcd(x; y).
The proof of Theorem 1 will be given in the nal version.
Proposed Scheme for Short Messages
In this section, we present our second IND-CCA2 scheme whose security is equivalent to factoring n = pq in the random oracle model, where p and q are arbitrary prime numbers. It is more ecient than our rst scheme for short messages. We combine Kurosawa et al's scheme with Bellare and Rogaway's scheme of [2] .
Note that [2] requires a one-way permutation f while Y pk (x) of Sec. 2.2 is four to one.
Scheme
Remember k is a security parameter. Let k 0 (1) and k 1 (1) be positive integer valued functions such that k 0 (k) + k 1 (k) < k for all k 1. Let n(k) = k 0 k 0 (k) 0 k 1 (k) be the length of a plaintext.
Let G be a mapping from k 0 bit strings to n + k 1 bit strings and let H be a mapping from n + k 1 bit strings to k 0 bit strings. They are treaded as random oracles.
Key generation algorithm: Choose two large primes p and q whose lengths are both k=2 bits. The secret key is a pair of p and q. ; q D )-breaks our public encryption scheme in the sense of IND-CCA2 with at most q G queries to G and at most q H queries to H, then there exists M which runs at most t (M ) steps and can factor N = pq with probability 
If there exists h such that y = Y pk (m); U pk (m) = V pk (m) = 0;
then obtain p;q from gcd(N; m 0m). Choose G(g) which is a random bits string with length n+k 1 , add an entry (g; G(g)) into G-list, and return G(g). H-query for h: If there is an entry (h; H(h)) in H-list, return H(h). Otherwise, choose H(h) which is a random bits string with length k 0 and add an entry (h; H(h)) into H-list. For all entry (g; G(g)) in G-list computes Eq.(2). If there exists g which satises Eq.(3), then obtain p; q from gcd(N; m 0m). Finally, return H(h). Then A 1 will outputs (x 0 ;x 1 ; str).
Next, M chooses a random bit b, and runs A 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ; str;ŷ). If A 2 makes G-queries and H-queries, M answers in the following ways. G-query for g: If there exists an entry (g; G(g)) in G-list, return G(g). Otherwise, compute Eq.(2) for all entry (h; H(h)) in H-list. If there exists h which satises Eq. (3), then obtain p; q from gcd(N; m 0m) and return G(g) = (x b jj0 k1 ) 8 h. Otherwise, choose G(g) which is a random bits string with length n + k 1 , add an entry (g; G(g)) into G-list, and return G(g If (N; c) is a legal public key of the proposed scheme and there is a pair of (g; h) which satises Eq.(2) and (3), gcd(N; m 0m) always presents p or q. For randomly chosen c, the probability with which (N; c) is a legal public key is 1=2. Therefore we can estimate (M ) similarly with the proof of Theorem 3 in [2] without the factor 1=2.
The running time of M is also similar with the proof of Theorem 3 in [2] except M needs additional time to compute p and q using gcd. When (N; c) is not a legal public key, it is possible that A never nish. In such a case M waits during t (A) and halts A.
Proof of Theorem 3
First, we show how to construct A 1 /A 2 which uses B 1 /B 2 as subroutine. This is done by showing that the chosen-ciphertext attacker is answered invalid plaintext with high probability for a decryption query unless the attacker has previously asked the random oracles G and H the queries corresponding to an encryption of the plaintext, the knowledge of which allows the recovery of the plaintext (i.e. the attacker is already aware of the plaintext of the decryption he is asking for). On input (x 0 ; x 1 ; strjjG-listjjH-list; y) A 2 runs B 2 on input (x 0 ; x 1 ; str;y). After this, B 2 will make G-query, H-query and decryption query. A 2 answers these queries in the same way as A 1 . Finally, A 2 outputs a bit b 0 or ? which B 2 outputs.
We will estimate the probability Adv A;5 (k). Let us denote the event \Dec-simulator can simulate decryption oracle correctly for all queries" with success D . In this section, we discuss about some variations of our schemes. First, we can reduce the running time of encryption four times in average if we add two bits (U pk ; V pk ) to the ciphertexts. In this case, we do not have to choose random numbers such that U pk = V pk = 0 while the ciphertext becomes two bits longer.
Next, we can replace Y pk (r) with r 2 mod N. In this case, however, the ciphertexts are not uniquely decrypted with small probabilities such as P 1 = 3=2 k0 in the scheme of Sec. 3; P 2 = 3=2 k 1 in the scheme of Sec. 4:
